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Alexei Trochev is ideally qualified to write this magnificent and highly important book. This 
will be required reading not only for those interested in public law and constitutional 
adjudication, but also anyone wishing to gain an understanding of contemporary Russia. 
Trochev combines the two disciplines necessary for such a study. He graduated in law (a five 
year degree, in the classic Russian system) in State University of Syktyvkar, capital of the Komi 
Republic in northwestern Russia in the 1990s, and taught constitutional law in Arkhangelsk. But 
he is also highly qualified in political science, with an MPA from Kansas, and he obtained his 
PhD at the University of Toronto, where his mentor has been Peter Solomon. He now teaches in 
the United States. 
His fieldwork is highly impressive. He spent two months in the Russian Constitutional Court 
(RCC) in 2001, and was given access to the Court’s entire archives, including a great deal of 
unpublished material. He put his political science skills to good use, interviewing 14 judges and 
officials, in Moscow and in the regions. He has read all the judgments of the Court and 
consulted a very wide range of sources in Russian and in English.1 
His subject-matter is fascinating both in terms of its legal authority and innovation and of its 
political impact. The RCC has the reputation of being the most – perhaps the only – independent 
judicial institution in contemporary Russia  (apart that is from the juries, which now hear the 
most serious criminal cases in every part of Russia except Chechnya). It is not so well known 
that the present court, which has been existence since 1995 – fourteen years of uninterrupted 
activity, is the third manifestation of constitutional justice in Russia since the dying days of the 
USSR. 
                                                 
1  The RCC website contains a great deal of material – indeed,  99% of the unpublished decisions can now be 
found there. See http://www.ksrf.ru/Pages/default.aspx 
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The first was the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the USSR, which was established 
in 1988, in Gorbachev’s perestroika, and continued work until the collapse and disintegration of 
the USSR in 1991.  
The second was the first RCC, which sat from 1992 to October 1993, when it was suspended by 
President Yeltsin, who also tore up the Constitution then in force – that of the Russian Socialist 
Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR) - and brought in the tanks to shell the Parliament 
(Supreme Soviet) of the RSFSR in the White House. The Court’s Chairman was the tough-
minded Valerii Zorkin. It was he who summoned the judges to sit all night to condemn Yeltsin’s 
action as unconstitutional.  
Although the Court did not sit again until 1995, all the judges were appointed to the new Court 
under the December 1993 Constitution. In 2003 the Chairman of the First Court, Valerii Zorkin, 
was elected Chairman of the Second, and is now beginning his third term, as I write.2  
Trochev states his core argument in his very first sentence. It is that: “… rulers – regardless of 
their authoritarian or democratic pedigree – create and tolerate new constitutional courts as long 
as the latter: (a) provide important benefits for the new rulers, and (b) do not interfere too much 
with public policies.”3    
He concludes, rather dismally, that “Short-term calculations of political elites appear to be 
everywhere: in the debates over the powers of the Court and its financial independence, and 
over the selection of the judges and their tenure. The Russian bureaucrats also appear to obey 
unfavourable Court judgments only when their bosses order them to do so.”4 His research 
demonstrates that “… the impact of Russian constitutional review on the lives of ordinary 
citizens, who courageously keep suing the state, has been limited.”5 
My only significant concern with this triumph of meticulous scholarship is the attention given to 
the effect of Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe since 1996, and its ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in 1998. The Russian judge at Strasbourg is one of the 
best judges on the Court, Anatolii Kovler. Speaking in May 2008, when a draft law was laid 
before the State Duma to seek to provide Russians with better domestic remedies for violations, 
he gave some facts and figures. In the ten years since ratification, 450 judgments have been 
rendered against Russia, three quarters of them from 2005 to 2007. There were 82 judgments in 
                                                 
2  See “Valerii Zorkin vnov izbran predsedatelem Konstitutsionnovo suda (Valerii Zorkin is again elected 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court)” 20 February 2009, at http://www.newsru.com/russia/20feb2009/zorkin.html  
3  Trochev (2008) p.19  
4  Trochev (2008) p.301 
5  Trochev (2008) p.302 
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2005, 102 in 2006, and 192 in 2007. This tempo is being maintained. This costs money for the 
Russian State. In 2006 Russian applicants were awarded a total of  €1.4 million in 
compensation, and in 2007 €4.3 million.6 Russia always pays. 
Has this had an effect on the RCC? Trochev’s book is not the source of answers to this question, 
and perhaps this is a reflection of his recent training and work in North America. Although he 
notes that “… the RCC examines the ECHR judgments in every instance of constitutional rights 
litigation; nevertheless, it does not always include references to them in the text of the 
decision…”7, he does not examine in any detail the cases where they do. 
Perhaps I am biased: I am a human rights lawyer. But I am struck by the fact that the revival  of 
the RCC on 24 June 1994, with a new Law which the judges themselves had drafted, and an 
increased complement of 19 judges, immediately preceded Russian’s engagement with the 
Council of Europe. It was a positive omen that continuity was retained, with all the pre-1993 
judges keeping their positions, including the controversial former Chairman – and now once 
again Chairman - Valerii Zorkin.  Even before ratification of the ECHR, the RCC began to refer 
to and apply the jurisprudence of the ECHR.8  
A breakthrough was made in the case of Maslov, decided on 27 June 2000.9 The case concerned 
the constitutionality of Articles 47 and 51 of the (previous) Criminal Procedural Code, and the 
issue at stake was the right to defence counsel following detention. According to the Code, a 
person in detention as a "suspected person" or an "accused", was entitled as of right to the 
presence of a defender. But this was not the case for a person brought to a police station to be 
interrogated as a "witness", even though attendance was compulsory, and might well lead to 
transformation into a suspect or accused. The Court not only referred to Article 14 of the UN’s 
ICCPR10 and Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR, but for the first time cited the jurisprudence. The 
cases - six in all - to which they referred were Quaranta v Switzerland11, Imbrioscia v 
Switzerland12, John Murray v United Kingdom13, Deweer v Belgium14, Eckle v Federal 
Republic of Germany15, and Foti v Italy16. The Court held that the Code must not be read 
                                                 
6  See http://www.newsru.com/russia/16may2008/vszakon.html, and 
http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/15may2008/strasburg2008.html 
7  Trochev (1998) p.176 
8  W. B. Simons “Russia's Constitutional Court and a Decade of Hard Cases: A Postscript “ Review of 
Central and East European Law, 1 September 2003, vol. 28, no. 3-4, pp. 655-678 
9  Case 11-P of 27 June 2000 – Trochev discusses these cases at p.175, note 238 
10  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
11  Series A No 205 (1991) 
12  Series A No 275 (1993) 
13  8 February 1996, Reports 1996-1, Vol 1 
14  Series A No 35 (1980) 
15  15 July 1982 (no.51), 5 EHRR 12 
 4
literally, since this would violate the spirit of the Constitution and of the Convention as 
interpreted by the Court. Witnesses too must have the right to a lawyer. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Furthermore, Trochev did not have the opportunity to consult the work of Anton Burkov on The 
Impact of the European Convention on Human and Application on Russian Law: Legislation 
and Application in 1996-200617. Burkov is now completing a PhD at Cambridge University, and 
his results are eagerly awaited. In his 2007 book, he reviewed the 54 judgments by August 2004 
citing the ECHR out of 215 altogether since the founding of the RCC in 1991, 166 since 
Russia’s accession to the Council, and 116 since ratification.18 Like Trochev, however, he is 
critical of the failure of the RCC to evaluate the case-law to which it refers, or even to reference 
it properly. 
The Justices of the RCC also played a leading role in another legal breakthrough. In the Soviet 
period, the USSR was perhaps the most assiduous ratifier of UN instruments, but never allowed 
these to have any serious internal effect. Thus, content must be given to Article 15 of the 1993 
Constitution19, which provides not only that the Constitution itself has "the highest legal force 
and direct effect", but, by Article 15.4  
"Generally recognised principles and norms of international law and international 
treaties of the Russian Federation shall be an integral part of its legal system. If other 
rules have been established by an international treaty of the Russian federation than 
provided for by law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply." 
The apotheosis of this new relationship seemed to have truly arrived with the Resolution of the 
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 10 October 2003. The Resolution is 
entitled On application by courts of general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized principles 
and norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation.20 
The Supreme Court consulted widely in composing this Resolution: participants in discussion 
included justices of the RCC, Justice Kovler, and other experts.21 
 
16  Series A No 56 (1982) 
17  Anton Burkov The Impact of the European Convention on Human and Application on Russian Law: 
Legislation and Application in 1996-2006 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2007) 
18  Burkov (2007) ibid, p.36 
19  The 1993 Constitution can be found in English at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/ConstMain.shtml 
20  Resolution No. 5 adopted by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 10 October 
2003, English translation to be found on the web-site of the Supreme Court, at 
http://www.supcourt.ru/EN/resolution.htm 
21  Although former justice, now consultant, at the Constitutional Court, Tamara Morshchakova, takes the 
view that the resolution itself violates the Constitution – conversations with the author.  
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This Resolution at last gave detailed instructions to the lower courts as to how to apply Article 
15(4), and the Federal Law of July 1995 “On International Treaties of the Russian 
Federation”22, to the same effect. Thus,  
                                                
“… the rights and liberties of man in conformity with commonly recognized principles 
and the norms of the international law, as well as the international treaties of the Russian 
Federation shall have direct effect within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. They 
shall determine the meaning, content and application of the laws, and the activities of the 
legislative and executive branches and local governments, and shall be secured by the 
judiciary.” 
Furthermore, with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Plenum directed 
that:  
“The courts within their scope of competence should act so as to ensure the 
implementation of obligations of the State stemming from the participation of the 
Russian Federation in the Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Basic 
Freedoms…. If the court in hearing a case has established the circumstances that 
contributed to the violation of the rights and liberties of citizens guaranteed by the 
Convention, the court has the right to issue its ruling (or decision) which would draw 
attention of relevant organisations and officials to the circumstances and facts of 
violation of the rights and liberties requiring that necessary measures be taken.” 
However, this last instruction appears to fall somewhat short of the requirement of the 
Constitution as to direct effect. The logic of the Constitution would appear to be that a Russian 
court would have the duty, not merely the right, to take measures to provide an effective remedy 
for a violation of Convention rights.23 As Trochev notes, applicants do not need to appeal to the 
RCC before going to Strasbourg.24 And the lower courts are not anything like as good as the 
RCC at paying attention to the ECHR. 
Indeed, until recently, the Constitutional Court was the only relatively independent part of the 
Russian judicial system. However, the Court has now been punished for its independence: it has 
been sent into exile. This has happened since Trochev’s book went to press; I can confirm that 
the book was in no way responsible.25 
The independence of this Court has led inexorably to a political decision, taken at the highest 
level, to move it well away from the centre of Russian power. In 2005 Professor Peter Solomon 
reported on plans, then apparently then ‘on hold’, to move the Constitutional Court from 
 
22  Federal law No 101-FZ dated 15 July 1995 “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation” 
23  See for more detail Bowring, B “Russia in a Common European Legal Space. Developing effective 
remedies for the violations of rights by public bodies: compliance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights” in Kaj Hober (ed) The Uppsala Yearbook of East European Law 2004 (London: Wildy, Simmonds and 
Hill, 2005) pp.89-116 
24  Trochev (2008) p.162 
25  Trochev (2008) discusses the move at pp.88-90 
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Moscow to St Petersburg – one example of the new ‘counterreform’, as Solomon expressed it, 
launched by then President Putin.26  
There was some delay in implementing this highly controversial decision, but the relevant law 
was enacted27, and the Constitutional Court was obliged to move, and did so in June 2008. 
Many commentators, and Judge Zorkin himself28, considered that this would mean a significant 
weakening of the Court. I note that the Court now occupies the lavishly refurbished palace of the 
Tsarist Senate, the highest court of the Russian Empire; and the judges each received a newly 
built neo-classical mansion in their own exclusive walled and gated community. This is rightly 
seen as a pay-off. 
This is not the only evidence of clear conflict between the Russian Government and the 
Constitutional Court as a result of its relative independence. In June 2007 Judge Zorkin sent to 
the State Duma a list of 15 Orders and 9 Determinations of the Court which have not – contrary 
to law – been actioned by the Duma, the oldest dated 23 December 2007. And on 22 February 
2008 it was reported that the Russian Government had for the third year running ignored the 
Determination of the Court of February 2005 on the raising of pensions.29 Thus, sending the 
Court into exile is the continuation of a policy of rank disrespect. Indeed, two chapters of 
Trochev’s book are devoted to the problems of non-implementation of the RCC’s judgments. 
It remains to be seen whether the Court will once again recover, as it did after 1993. 
2,649 words including footnotes 
 
26 Solomon, P (2005) “Threats of Judicial Counterreform in Putin's Russia” v.13 Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 325  
27 Kolesnikov, A (2007) ‘Pereyezd okonchatelniy, obzhalovaniyu ne podlezhit (The transfer decision is final, 
no appeal is possible’ Kommersant 24 December No 237(3813) at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=839229 
28 See “Glava Konstitutsionnovo suda protivitsya pereyezdu v Peterburg (Head of the Constitutional Court 
opposes the move to St Petersburg)” Russia On-Line 24 November 2006 at 
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2006/11/24/court/; and see also Syuzanna Farizova, Yurii Chernega “Valerii Zorkin 
khochet ostavit chast sudei v Moskve. A Kreml otpravlyaet KS v Peterburg v polnom sostave (Valerii Zorkin wants 
to leave part of the judges in Moscow. And the Kremlin is sending the Constitutional Court to St Petersburg en 
bloc)” Kommersant 24 November 2006 at  http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=724706 
29  ‘Pravitelstvo RF uzhe tretiy god ignoriruet postanovleniye KS o povishenii pensii (The Government of the 
RF already for the third year ignores the order of the CC on raising pensions) at 
http://www.newsru.com/russia/22feb2008/kskabmin.html 
